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Abstract
We investigate the impact of the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA) on
Canadian exports to Chile, particularly the dynamic effects of the agreement on extensive
and intensive margins of trade. Consistent with the literature, we find that the extensive
margin effects occurred later than the intensive margin effects and became more prominent
in the long-term. Surprisingly, the intensive margin effects died off in the long-term. A
theoretical model is constructed to show that our results can arise in a standard setting of
intra-industry trade.
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1 Introduction
The Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA), signed in December 1996 and implemented
in July 1997, is a comprehensive agreement that covers trade in goods and services, as well as the
bilateral investment relationship. Since its implementation, the value of Canadian merchandise
exports to Chile more than doubled to reach $819 million in 2011 from $392 million in 1997,
growing at an annual rate of 5.4 percent. In comparison, Canadian merchandise exports to the
whole Latin American region over the same period increased only by 1.7 percent. This propelled
Chile from being the seventh-most important market in Latin America for Canadian exports
in 1997 to the third-most important in 2011 (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
2013).
The objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of the CCFTA on Canadian exports
to Chile, particularly the short-term and long-term effects of the agreement on extensive and
intensive margins of trade. We first use the Regression Discontinuity approach to estimate the
treatment effects of the CCFTA on Canadian exports to Chile. We then decompose the growth
in Canadian exports after the CCFTA into extensive margin and intensive margin over the
period from 1997 to 2008. The use of firm-level data enables us to measure the margins of trade
in terms of products and firms, respectively.
Our analysis indicates that the CCFTA boosted Canadian exports to Chile by approximately
$54 million dollars per year. In the short-term, the effects of the CCFTA were driven mainly by
the intensive margin. But the extensive margin effect became more prominent in the long-term,
and it was particularly pronounced for firms and products that entered the Chilean market after
2002. Surprisingly, the intensive margin effect died off in the long-term. To our knowledge,
this is the first empirical evidence that the intensive margin effect of trade liberalization could
vanish in the long-term.
The last finding is particularly striking given the common belief among economists that trade
liberalization would expand both the extensive margin and intensive margin of trade. To explain
our finding, we construct a theoretical model of intra-industry trade, in which we show that the
fall in prices resulted from entry of new firms and products can indeed drive the intensive margin
effect to zero in the long-term. This suggests that our empirical finding can arise in a standard
framework of intra-industry trade and hence is not necessarily an anomaly.
Our theoretical analysis identifies two opposing forces that drive the intensive margin of
trade. On the one hand, trade liberalization enables existing exporters to expand their exports
in the short-term (during which the number of competitors is fixed). On the other hand, the
reduction in trade costs induces entry of additional competitors into the export market, which
lowers the marginal revenues of the existing exporters and causes them to decrease their exports.
Consequently, the overall impact of trade liberalization on the intensive margin is ambiguous
in the long-term. In our model, the expansion of the intensive margin in the short-term is
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exactly offset by the impact of entry of additional exporters, leaving the intensive margin of
trade unchanged in the long-term.
In the literature, formal analysis of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) dates back to
Viner (1950) and Meade (1955). Examination of PTAs in terms of their effects on extensive
and intensive margins is, however, much more recent. They include Hillberry and McDaniel
(2002), Kehoe and Ruhl (2013), and Baier et al. (2014).1 Hillberry and McDaniel (2002)
provide a decomposition of trade growth into the intensive margin and extensive margin since
the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Their analysis
reveals both a widening effect (extensive margin) and a deepening effect (intensive margin)
of international trade on U.S. industries. Kehoe and Ruhl (2013) study the margins of trade
associated with a number of large-scale trade liberalizations, including the NAFTA and the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, and find significant evidence of growth in both the extensive
margin and the intensive margin. Baier et al. (2014) examine, among other things, the timing of
the extensive and intensive margin responses to various types of economic integration agreements
(EIAs) that include one-way and two-way PTAs, FTAs, and deeper EIAs (i.e., customs unions,
common markets, and economic unions). They show that the shorter-term effects of EIAs on
trade flows are more at the intensive margin and longer-term effects are more at the extensive
margin.
It should be pointed out that in all three studies, the intensive margin of trade growth
is found to be substantially larger than the extensive margin. Kehoe and Ruhl (2013), for
example, demonstrate that the extensive margin accounted for 11.7 percent and the intensive
margin accounted for the other 88.3 percent of the growth in total exports from Canada to the
U.S. over the period from 1989 to 1999. In Baier et al. (2014), while the magnitude of the
intensive margin tends to become smaller in the longer-term, it remains much larger than that
of extensive margin. Indeed, their estimates imply that the long-term extensive margin effect
of a free trade agreement is 15.6 percent while the corresponding intensive margin effect is 8.8
percent.2
Our analysis of the CCFTA, in contrast, reveals that the intensive margin effect actually
vanishes in the long-term, and this observation holds for trade margins measured by products
and by firms. Indeed, the most significant contributions of this paper are the empirical finding
of the vanishing long-term intensive margin and the development of a theory that accounts for
this finding.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. Section 3 estimates the
1In addition, there is a larger and broader literature that considers the extensive and intensive margins of
international trade in general, not specifically tied to any trade agreements. See, for example, Hummels and
Klenow (2005), Felbermayr and Kohler (2006), Eaton et al. (2008), Helpman et al. (2008), Bernard et al (2009),
Besedes and Prusa (2011).
2These numbers are calculated using the estimated coefficients of Lag∆FTA in Table 1 of Baier et al. (2014).
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overall effects of the CCFTA on Canadian exports to Chile, while section 4 examines the ex-
tensive and intensive margins in the short-term and long-term. Section 5 presents a theoretical
model that rationalizes our empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The data used in this study is from Canada’s Export Registry (1993-2005) and covers the uni-
verse of Canadian exporting firms that have at least one shipment to a foreign market from 1993
to 2005. The Export Registry is linked with the Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program
(LEAP) data and the Corporate Tax Statistical Universal File (T2SUF). The LEAP database
is an administrative database created by the Business and Labour Market Analysis (BLMA)
division at Statistics Canada that provides longitudinal data on the employment levels of Cana-
dian businesses (Baldwin, et al. 1992). It covers the period from 1984 to 2008, and makes use
of administrative tax records from the Business Register and from the Survey of Employment,
Payrolls and Hours (SEPH) to generate employment profile of businesses over time. The T2SUF
file includes all incorporated firms that file a T2 tax return with the Canada Revenue Agency
(CRA). The T2 file provides data on sales, gross profits, equity and assets for all incorpo-
rated firms in Canada. The linked data provided to us, however, contain only the information of
sales. Finally, the length of the linked data is asymmetric with respect to the time of the CCFTA
agreement, as more years of data are available post agreement than prior to the agreement.
The final data set contains the following information:
• Firm characteristics on a yearly basis. They include size (number of employees) and
labour productivity (sales per worker), which have been found to be important drivers of
firms export decisions (Bernard and Jensen 1999 and 2004). The age of a firm, which is
an important variable for this study, can be determined from the LEAP data. Another
firm-specific variable important for the study is the country of ownership.
• Product characteristics on yearly basis. The information is obtained from a product code
classified at 8-digit Harmonized Schedule (HS8). As the data do not provide product-
specific characteristics, these characteristics need to be identified in order to distinguish
between core products and marginal products.
• Industry characteristics. The database provides information with regard to the industry
to which an exporter is classified at 6-digit North American Industry Classification Code
(NAICS6).
For firms that entered the market before 1993, the data cannot identify the first year of a
firm’s entry into and exit out of a foreign market (here Chile), number of years it exported or
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its value of exports, number of exporting destinations if different than Chile, and number of
products exported in each year. This information can be only identified for firms that entered
the market after 1993.
The linked data provided by Statistics Canada covers a high proportion of the firms. How-
ever, the linking is not done uniformly for all available years. The most recent years are better
linked than the earlier years. We checked to see if the unlinked data may bias the trade effects.
We did so by plotting the data for the number of firms and products for the linked and unlinked
data over the period of interest (see Figure 1). The graph shows that the unlinked firms and
products move in a proportional way with the linked firms and products. Therefore, the data
available for this study should enable us to pin down the trade effects if present.3
[insert Figure 1 here]
The dynamics of the number of industries, firms and their products are presented in Tables
1 and 2. As can be seen from Table 1, after 1997 there was a rapid growth in entry by Canadian
firms into the Chilean market and an increase in the number of new products sold in the Chilean
market associated with these entrants. Furthermore, the decomposition of the export values by
old and new products in Table 2 show an increased contribution of the new products in the total
value of exports to Chile after the CCFTA.
[insert Table 1 and Table 2 here]
3 Overall Effects of the CCFTA
Prior to the CCFTA, Canadian exports to Chile were subject to an 11-percent tariff. When the
CCFTA came into effect in July 1997, 75 per cent of Canadian exports gained duty-free access
to the Chilean market immediately. For most of the remaining industrial and resource-based
goods, the 11-percent tariffs were eliminated over five years (Foreign Affairs and International
Trade Canada 1997). As some of the tariff changes were not sharp but decreased in a continuous
way until it became zero, the method to be used to evaluate the CCFTA needs to be able to
capture these dynamics.
Consequently, to estimate the impact of these tariff changes on exports by Canadian firms,
we use a regression discontinuity (RD) approach based on Lee and Lemieux (2010). The main
idea behind the RD design is that firms that were just below the cutoff (who did not receive the
treatment and entered Chile’s market before trade agreement) were good comparisons to firms
just above the cutoff (who did receive the treatment and enter Chile’s market after the trade
agreement).
3If, on the other hand, no parallel trends were observed, the results obtained with the linked data would be
biased.
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To help determine the design of our RD analysis, we plot in Figure 2 the number of products
exported to Chile and in Figure 3 the value of exports to Chile by windows of years. In Figure 2,
we see that the increase in the number of products started one year before the implementation of
the CCFTA and continued thereafter, indicating a relatively fuzzy discontinuity for the number
of products around the time of the CCFTA implementation. Figure 3, on the other hand, shows
a sharp rise in export values in the year of the implementation and the change in export values
continued to be visible thereafter. A similar pattern is obtained if we plot the total number
of firms exporting to Chile and their total sales. An interesting finding is that indirect effects
of subsequent trade agreements between Chile and the European Union (signed in 2002) and
between Chile and the United States (signed in 2003) are observed. However, these effects are
not sharp in nature.
[insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 here]
Taking the above observations into consideration, we use different window lengths around
the cutoff point to see how robust is the estimation of the potential jump in the treated outcome
around the trade agreement date. The same methodology is adopted to assess the indirect effect
on the Canadian exporters of other agreements Chile signed with the EU and USA. Both the
sharp and the fuzzy discontinuity designs are used in the analysis.
3.1 Methodology
The identification of the trade effects in the neighborhood of the free trade agreement can be
explained with the following reduced form specification
yi = β0 + β1Treatmenti + δ(Tariffi) + i, (1)
where yi denotes the value of export to Chile by Canadian firm i during the window period
(specified below), Treatmenti = 0 if Tariffi >= 11, which is the Chilean tariff on imports from
Canada before the CCFTA and Treatment = 1 if Tariffi < 11, which is the Chilean tax after
the implementation of the trade agreement. The underlying assumption for the identification of
the treatment effect is that the δ(Tariffi) is continuous around the cutoff. The estimation is
performed at 1-year, 2-year and 3-year windows around the cutoff point.
According to Hahn et al. (2000) the treatment effect is identified as
β(z0) =
limz→z+0 E(yi|zi = z)− limz→z−0 E(yi|zi = z)
limz→z+0 prob(z)− limz→z−0 prob(z)
, (2)
where z is tariff value and z0 is the cut-off tariff value at the time of CCFTA. The estimation of
the above treatment parameter is done using local polynomial regression to the left and to the
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right of the discontinuity point as follows:
min
β(.)
E(yi − α− β(zi))2K(zi − z0
h
), (3)
where K
(
zi−z0
h
)
is a Kernel function that gives more weight to the observations close to the
discontinuity point and less weight to those further away from the discontinuity point.
It is important to note that RD evaluation provides an answer to a specific question: what is
the treatment effect of the CCFTA for the Canadian exporters when we evaluate their exports
and total sales values (the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated, or ATT)? The advantage
of this method over other methods for the evaluation of the ATT (propensity score matching,
for example) is that it provides a clean evaluation with minimal assumptions and bypasses
many of the questions related to different parametric model specifications, questions that may
be related to which variables to include in the model and their functional forms. One limitation
associated with this method is that other aspects of the impact distribution may be of interest in
an evaluation of the treatment effects of any given policy. However, we consider this method fit
for this analysis for its superior advantages and due to the specificity of our question of interest.
3.2 Results from the Regression Discontinuity Analysis
The RD analysis requires a sharp design evaluation at the CCFTA and a fuzzy design evaluation
at the subsequent free trade agreements between Chile and EU/USA. The results of this analysis
will provide a measure of the Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT). In this case we
will evaluate the ATT effects for the Canadian exporters to Chile of their export values.
[insert Table 3 here]
The results from the RD analysis are presented in Table 3. The most important takeaway
from Table 3 is that the CCFTA significantly increased the exports to Chile by Canadian
firms. Its long-term impact is estimated to be 54 million dollars per year. In addition, the
subsequent trade agreements signed by Chile with the EU and USA had a direct negative impact
on Canadian exports (11 million dollars) in the first year, but they did not have a statistically
significant effect on the exports in the longer term. In other words, Chile’s trade agreements
with the EU and USA had no lasting impact on the values of Canadian exports to Chile.
Robustness checks were also performed using conditional RD analysis where the control
variables were firm size and firm productivity. The conditional RD analysis do not change the
results for the ATT, which means that the unconditional results are not endogenously driven.
The fact that we did not observe significant effects of the subsequent trade agreements
suggests that the ATT obtained for the CCFTA was not altered by those agreements. Moreover,
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the fact that the ATT was stable over different window lengths and no other discontinuity was
identified for the period of investigation and that controlling for different other factors did not
change the results of the analysis indicate that the ATT measure was consistently estimated.
[insert Figures 4 and 5 here]
Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate the above analyses graphically. In Figure 4, we observe a visible
discontinuity in the value of Canadian exports to Chile around 1997, the year the CCFTA went
into effect. Figure 5 shows the export value around 2002, the year Chile signed the free trade
agreement with the European Union. It shows a less apparent discontinuity than in Figure 4.
Test of discontinuities around these dates of interest were performed and the results confirm
the existence of these discontinuities. As the graphical representations suggest, a sharp regression
discontinuity design should be applied when the trade effects on new firms and products is tested
around the implementation of the CCFTA.
4 Effects of the CCFTA on the Margins of Trade
4.1 Methodology
In the literature, there are a number of ways to decompose the margins of international trade.
Here we follow Besedes and Prusa (2011) and consider three channels of export growth: entry,
survival and deepening, with the first channel being the extensive margin and the latter two the
intensive margin. To be more specific, let Xt denote the value of exports from Canada to Chile
in period t, nt the number of exporting relationships in period t, vt the average value of exports
per relationship. Then Xt = ntvt. Export relationships in period t consist of those that survive
from t− 1 to t, denoted by nst , and new relationships, denoted by net , so that nt = nst + net .
Using these notations, we can write the change in export values between period t and period
t+ 1 as:
Xt+1 −Xt = nt+1vt+1 − ntvt = net+1vt+1 + nst+1(vt+1 − vt)− (nt − nst+1)vt. (4)
On the right-hand side of equation (4), the first term represents the change in export value due
to new relationships (the entry channel), and the second term measures the change due to the
increase in the average value of the surviving relationships (the deepening channel). The third
term expresses the decrease in export value caused by the relationships that end between the
two periods, thus indicating the change in export value through the survival channel. As pointed
out by Besedes and Prusa (2011), the first term (entry) measures the extensive margin, and the
sum of the second and third term (deepening and survival) gauges the intensive margin.
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Margins of international trade can be measured in terms of countries, products or firms.
Since we study a particular pair of countries (Canada and Chile), our decomposition of trade
margins are conducted in terms of products and firms. Specifically, let pt be the number of
products exported by a Canadian firm to Chile, nt the number of Canadian firms that exports
to Chile, and xt the average value of exports per firm-product. Then Xt = ptftxt. In the case
of product margins of trade, an export relationship is the exports of a product from Canada to
Chile. Accordingly, the number of export relationships is the number of products exported by
Canada to Chile, i.e., nt = pt, and thus vt = ftxt.
Similarly, in the case of firm margins of trade, the number of export relationships is measured
by the number of firms that exports from Canada to Chile, i.e., nt = ft. Accordingly, the average
export value per relationship is given by vt = ptxt.
4.2 Results
We start by examining what happened with the distribution of industries before and after the
CCFTA. Figure 6 shows the number of Canadian firms that exported to Chile (displayed along
the vertical axis) for various industies between 1993 and 2008. It identifies the Canadian indus-
tries that experienced growth in exports to Chile after the CCFTA. In particular, a number of
manufacturing industries witnessed growth in the number of exporting firms to Chile, including
Chemical Manufacturing (NAICS 325), Plastic and Rubber Products Manufacturing (NAICS
326), Fabricated Metal Products (NAICS 332), Machinery Manufacturing (NAICS 333), Com-
puter and Electronic Products (NAICS 334), and Transportation Equipment (NAICS 336).
Other growth industries included wholesale trade of machinery equipment and supply (NAICS
417) and professional, scientific and technical services (NAICS 541).
[insert Figures 6 here]
Next, we display in Figure 7 the dynamics of the old and new firms that entered the Chilean
market before and after the CCFTA (the dynamics of the new and old products is similar). The
graph shows that over the long-term the incumbent firms were slowly exiting the market after
the agreement while new firms were entering at an increasing rate.
[insert Figure 7 here]
Most importantly, we want to measure the margins of trade associated with the entry of new
firms, new products and their effects relative to the old firms and old products. To start the
analysis, we do a decomposition and compare the dynamics of the export values of the old firms
with old products and old firms with new products versus the new firms with old products and
new firms with new products. In particular, we do the decomposition as in Equation (4) and
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show the contribution of the intensive margin and extensive margin of trade. These results are
presented in Tables 4–5 and Figure 8.
[insert Table 4, Table 5 and Figure 8 here]
From these two tables and Figure 8, we make the following observations:
• The effect of CCFTA was driven by the intensive margin associated with the older products
initially, but changed with time.
• When we mix the margins of trade between firms and products, the result becomes very
interesting. The new firms brought in more older products than older firms bringing in
new products immediately after the free trade agreement.
• However, if we look at a longer horizon after the free trade agreement came into effect, the
contributions of the new firms with new products increased almost exponentially towards
the end of the observed period.
Based on the above findings, we conclude that new firms and new products drove the long-term
effects of the CCFTA, while older firms and products were the driver of the short-term effect.
In other words, while the intensive margin played an important role in the short-term, it died
off and the extensive margin took the center stage in the long-term.4
5 A Theoretical Model
A surprising finding from our empirical analysis is the fading of the CCFTA effect on the
intensive margin of trade in the long-term. This is in sharp contrast to the prediction from
trade models a` la Melitz (2003) that trade liberalization should have a positive effect on both
the extensive margin and the intensive margin of trade. The purpose of this section is to
reconcile our empirical findings with theory. We will proceed in two steps. First, we will study
a generic optimization problem by an exporter to demonstrate that while trade liberalization
has a positive effect on the intensive margin of trade in the short run, its effect is ambiguous
in the long run. Second, we present a specific model to support our empirical finding that the
effect on the intensive margin can be zero in the long run.
Our theory is based on the premise that there is a delay for new firms or new products to
enter a new country. This could either be due to the entry costs that new exports have to incur
(Ruhl 2008) or the source adjustment friction that prevents buyers from switching to lower-cost
4Using a different measure of margins of trade, a study by Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
(2013) also find a gradual decline of intensive margins four years after the implementation of CCFTA.
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sources of supply instantaneously (Arkolakis et al 2011). Accordingly, new products or new
firms enter export markets with a lag after a trade agreement.
Consider the quantity decision of a firm that exports to a foreign market. Let MR(x,N)
denote the firm’s marginal revenue in the foreign market, which depends on its quantity of
exports (x) and the number of competitors in the market (N). It is reasonable to assume that
the marginal revenue is a decreasing function in the quantity and in the number of competitors;
that is, ∂MR/∂x < 0 and ∂MR/∂N < 0. On the cost side, the firm incurs marginal costs of
production c and trade costs t for each unit of exports. To maximize its profit, the firm chooses
the quantity of exports in such a way that
MR(x,N) = c+ t. (5)
Now suppose that the magnitude of t is reduced as a result of a trade agreement. Conducting
comparative statics on (5), we find that
∂x
∂t
=
1
∂MR/∂x
< 0, (6)
which implies that holding the number of competitors constant, a decrease in trade costs raises
the quantity of exports by this firm. Thus, the short-run effect of the trade agreement on the
intensive margin of trade is positive.
In the long run, the extensive margin of trade expands as additional firms enter the export
market. Accordingly, we assume that ∂N/∂t < 0. Taking into account this change in the
extensive margin, we can write the long-run effect on the intensive margin as,
dx
dt
=
∂x
∂t
+
∂x
∂N
∂N
∂t
=
1
∂MR/∂x
− ∂MR/∂N
∂MR/∂x
∂N
∂t
. (7)
The sign of (7) is ambiguous because the two terms on its right-hand side represent two opposing
forces. On the one hand, the trade agreement lowers the per unit cost of exports, thus inducing
the firm to expand exports when the number of competitors is held constant (in the short run).
On the other hand, the entry of additional competitors reduces the marginal revenue of this
firm, causing it to reduce the quantity of exports. Therefore, the effect of trade liberalization
on the intensive margin is ambiguous in the long run.
In the existing theoretical literature, the effect of trade liberalization on the intensive margin
is typically positive because these models are constructed in such a way that the short-run effect
dominates the long-run effect. For example, consider the standard monopolistic competition
model of international trade, in which each firm faces a constant-elasticity demand function.
Let σ denote the (constant) elasticity of demand and f the fixed cost associated with exports.
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It is well-known that a firm in such a model sets a price that is proportional to its marginal cost,
specifically, p = σ(c+t)/(σ−1). Then the firm’s profit from exporting is pi = (c+t)x/(σ−1)−f .
In the long run, free entry and exit drives the profit of the firm to zero, implying that the quantity
of exports by the firm in the long run is,
x =
(σ − 1)f
c+ t
. (8)
In this case, a lower trade cost t necessarily raises the quantity of exports by the firm, even in
the long run. But our preceding analysis suggests that this definite sign for the long-run effect
on the intensive margin is due to the specific features of the model.
Next, we present a more elaborate model that will support our empirical finding that the
long-run effect on the intensive margin of trade can indeed be zero. Suppose there are two coun-
tries, A and B. Firms in these two countries manufacture differentiated products for domestic
consumption and (possibly) exports. We use x and y to denote the quantity of a firm located
in country A and country B, respectively. To be more specific, let xik be the output of a firm
i in country A destined for country k, and yjk be the output of a firm j in country B destined
for country k, where k = A or B. Similarly, pik and qjk denote the prices of a product sold in
country k originated from a firm in country A and country B, respectively. Let n and m be the
number of firms located in country A and B, respectively. Some of these firms in each country
will export their products to the other country. We use ne(≤ n) and me(≤ m) to denote the
number of exporters in country A and country B, respectively.
Assume that the two countries are symmetric in all aspects. In what follows, we will specify
the model for country A only, with the understanding that country B is completely symmetric.
Suppose that the demand in country A for the good produced by a domestic firm i (=1,2,. . .n)
is represented by
piA = α− xiA − θ
∑
j 6=i
xjA − δ
me∑
j=1
yjA. (9)
The demand in country A for the good produced by a foreign firm j (=1,2, . . .me) is represented
by
qjA = α− yjA − θ
∑
i 6=j
yiA − δ
n∑
i=1
xiA. (10)
In (9) and (10), δ < θ < 1. This implies a good is a closer substitute for the other goods
produced in the same country than for those produced in a different country.
In country A, there are n+me competitors. Each firm that sells in country A incurs marginal
costs of production c and fixed costs f . Moreover, a firm that exports to country A from country
B incurs trade costs t per unit of output. Firms compete in quantity.
Given the demand and cost functions, we can examine the firms’ quantity decisions for
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country A independent of those for country B. The optimization problem of a domestic firm in
country A is
max
xiA
piA = (piA − c)xiA − f = (α− xiA − θ
∑
j 6=i
xjA − δ
me∑
j=1
yjA − c)xiA − f. (11)
Similarly, the optimization problem of an exporting firm in country B is
max
yjA
piB = (qjA − c− t)yjA − f = (α− yjA − θ
∑
i 6=j
yiA − δ
n∑
i=1
xiA − c− t)yjA − f. (12)
The first-order conditions associated with (11) and (12) are
α− c− 2xiA − θ
∑
j 6=i
xjA − δ
me∑
j=1
yjA = 0 (i = 1, 2, . . . n); (13)
α− c− t− 2yjA − θ
∑
i 6=j
yiA − δ
n∑
i=1
xiA = 0 (j = 1, 2, . . .me). (14)
Noting that all domestic firms (and respectively, all exporters from country B) are symmetric,
we solve (13) and (14) to obtain:
xSRiA =
(α− c)[2− θ + (θ − δ)me] + δmet
(2− θ)(2− θ + θn+ θme) + (θ2 − δ2)n ; (15)
ySRjA =
(α− c)[2− θ + (θ − δ)me]− (2− θ + θn)t
(2− θ)(2− θ + θn+ θme) + (θ2 − δ2)n . (16)
Equations (15) and (16) are the short-run equilibrium quantities given the number of competitors
(n and me) in country A. In the long run, the number of competitors is determined by the free
entry condition, piA = piB = 0.
Now consider the effects of a trade liberalization agreement between the two countries that
reduces trade costs t. Our interest is in the effects of the agreement on the intensive margin and
extensive margin of trade. Specifically, we want to find out how the reduction in t affects the
quantity exported to country A by a firm in country B, yjA (i.e., the intensive margin) and the
number of firms in country B that export to country A, me (i.e., the extensive margin).
In the short run, the number of competitors in a country is fixed. From (16), we find
∂ySRjA
∂t
= − 2− θ + θn
(2− θ)(2− θ + θn+ θme) + (θ2 − δ2)n < 0. (17)
This reaffirms our earlier finding from (6) that, in the short run, a reduction in trade costs
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increases the quantity of exports by each firm.
It can be verified that the reduction in t raises the profit of an exporter in country B. This
induces additional firms in country B to enter the market in country A, thus expanding the
extensive margin of trade. At the same time, the entry of additional exporters into country A has
the effect of offsetting the expansion of intensive margin of trade, as implied by ∂ySRjA /∂me < 0.
To find the long-run effects of trade liberalization on the intensive margin and extensive
margin of trade, we use the free entry condition, along with (15) and (16), to find the long-run
equilibrium:
me =
(θ − δ)[α− c− (2− θ)√f ]− θt
(θ2 − δ2)√f ; (18)
n =
(θ − δ)[α− c− (2− θ)√f ] + δt
(θ2 − δ2)√f ; (19)
xLRiA = y
LR
jA =
√
f. (20)
From (18), it is easy to see that ∂me/∂t < 0; that is, a reduction in t increases the number of
exporters from country B and thus enlarges the extensive margin of trade.
Furthermore, from (20) we see that the long-run quantity of exports by a firm in country B,
yLRjA , is independent of t. In other words, a change in trade costs has no impact on the intensive
margin of trade in the long run. While the reduction in trade costs causes the intensive margin
to expand when the number of competitors is fixed, this effect is offset by the increase in the
number of exporters, leaving the intensive margin of trade unchanged in the long run. This is
consistent with what we have found in our empirical analysis of the CCFTA.
6 Conclusions
The paper makes two contributions to the literature on the impact of preferential trade agree-
ments on the margins of trade. First, we observe an interesting phenomenon regarding the
short-term and long-term effects of a PTA (namely, the CCFTA). Specifically, we find that in
the short-term, the effects of CCFTA on Canadas exports to Chile were driven mainly by the
intensive margin. But in the long-term the intensive margin died off while the extensive margin
effect picked up. Firm-level and product-level analyses show that the short-term impact of the
trade agreement was mainly driven by the intensive margins associated with the old products
and old firms. Over time, the extensive margins associated with the new firms and new products
become more prominent, with the contribution of the new firms with new products increasing
almost exponentially towards the end of the sample period.
Second, this paper contributes to the theoretical literature by pointing out that the long-
term impact of trade liberalization on the intensive margin is, in principle, ambiguous. Our
14
theoretical model highlights the two opposing forces of a trade liberalization agreement. On
the one hand, it induces existing exporters to expand exports in the short-term. On the other
hand, it brings about entry of additional competitors into the export market. This lowers the
marginal revenues of existing exporters and causes them to reduce their quantities of exports.
In the literature, the impact of trade liberalization on the intensive margin is typically positive
because the existing models are constructed in such a way that the short-term effect dominates
the long-term effect. In our model, on the other hand, while the reduction in trade costs causes
the intensive margin to expand in the short-term, this effect is offset by the increase in the
number of exporters, leaving the intensive margin of trade unchanged in the long-term.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Tables
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Table 1: Industries, Firms and Products - Exporters to Chile - Linked Data (2008)
Year No. Industries No. Firms No. Products
1993 56 128 279
1994 71 155 347
1995 78 201 327
1996 110 398 490
1997 119 470 543
1998 126 568 605
1999 123 527 638
2000 124 567 656
2001 128 594 661
2002 131 645 738
2003 147 849 942
2004 160 986 1108
2005 166 1018 1171
2006 154 1056 1218
2007 160 1076 1153
2008 176 1171 1231
Table 2: Value of Exports by Old and New products
Year Export Value Old Products New Products
1993 7.48E+07 7.48E+07 0
1994 1.61E+08 3.30E+07 1.28E+08
1995 1.47E+08 1.03E+07 1.37E+08
1996 1.50E+08 6.41E+07 8.61E+07
1997 1.96E+08 2.80E+07 1.68E+08
1998 1.41E+08 3.49E+07 1.06E+08
1999 2.04E+08 1.50E+07 1.89E+08
2000 2.33E+08 2.04E+07 2.12E+08
2001 1.88E+08 6642421 1.82E+08
2002 1.53E+08 1.34E+07 1.40E+08
2003 1.56E+08 1.22E+07 1.43E+08
2004 1.96E+08 1.91E+07 1.77E+08
2005 2.04E+08 5381432 1.99E+08
2006 2.71E+08 1.35E+07 2.57E+08
2007 4.60E+08 2.67E+07 4.33E+08
2008 4.30E+08 1.70E+07 4.13E+08
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Table 3: ATT Effects (in thousands of dollars) on Export Values
Treatment Year Window Outcome Coef Std Error p-value
1997 1 year exports 27385.88 8717.32 0.002
1997 2 years exports 53858.5 15782.3 0.001
1997 3 years exports 54712.8 15667.4 0.000
1997 all years exports 54427.8 15700.3 0.001
2002 1 year exports -11363.2 6339.5 0.073
2002 2 years exports -7657.97 11131.5 0.491
2002 3 years exports -7486.4 11141 0.502
Table 4: Export Values by Type of Firm and Type of Product
Year OF-OP OF-NP NF-OP NF-NP
1993 74,800,000 0 0 0
1994 161,000,000 0 0 0
1995 147,000,000 0 0 0
1996 150,000,000 0 0 0
1997 128,000,000 n.a. 40,700,000 n.a.
1998 42,000,000 15,800,000 51,800,000 31,300,000
1999 40,300,000 n.a. 67,300,000 n.a.
2000 91,000,000 35,500,000 34,500,000 70,800,000
2001 65,600,000 20,200,000 39,500,000 61,200,000
2002 28,400,000 10,900,000 69,200,000 43,600,000
2003 30,300,000 17,700,000 57,300,000 48,400,000
2004 32,500,000 29,100,000 54,200,000 78,500,000
2005 29,900,000 24,100,000 59,000,000 88,200,000
2006 29,600,000 33,700,000 65,000,000 141,000,000
2007 50,800,000 25,400,000 58,900,000 325,000,000
2008 87,600,000 15,400,000 77,800,000 217,000,000
Note: OF-OP = Old Firms with Old Products; OF-NP = Old Firms with New Products;
NF-OP = New Firms with Old Products and NF-NP= New Firms with New Products
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Table 5: Intensive and Extensive Margin of Trade
Year Deepening Survival IM EM Total Change in EV
1996 150,000,000 150,000,000 150,000,000
1997 128,000,000 128,000,000 128,000,000
1998 42,000,000 15,800,000 26,200,000 31,300,000 57,500,000
1999 40,300,000 42,000,000 -1,700,000 n.a. n.a
2000 91,000,000 40,300,000 50,700,000 70,800,000 121,500,000
2001 65,600,000 91,000,000 -25,400,000 61,200,000 35,800,000
2002 28,400,000 65,600,000 -37,200,000 43,600,000 6,400,000
2003 30,300,000 28,400,000 1,900,000 48,400,000 50,300,000
2004 32,500,000 30,300,000 2,200,000 78,500,000 80,700,000
2005 29,900,000 32,500,000 -2,600,000 88,200,000 85,600,000
2006 29,600,000 29,900,000 -300,000 141,000,000 140,700,000
2007 50,800,000 29,600,000 21,200,000 325,000,000 346,200,000
2008 87,600,000 50,800,000 36,800,000 217,000,000 253,800,000
Note: IM = Intensive Margin, EM = Extensive Margin, EV = Export Value
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Figure 1: Firms and Products - Linked and Unlinked Data
19
0 
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
600 
700 
800 
93-96 94-96 95-96 96 97 98 98-99 98-00 98-01 98-02 98-03 98-04 98-05 98-06 98-07 
258.5 
289 
304.5 
374 
418 
460 
472 
482.6666667 489.5 
507 
547.8333333 
600.5714286 
649.75 
694.8888889 
725.8 
758.9090909 
Number of Products by Windows 
Figure 2: Number of Products Exported to Chile by Windows
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Figure 3: Value of Exports to Chile by Windows
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Figure 4: Export Values - Benchmark 1997
Figure 5: Export Values - Benchmark 2002
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Figure 6: Distribution of Industries Before and After CCFTA
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Old Firms New Firms
Figure 7: Numbers of Old and New Firms
Figure 8: Export Values of Old Firms with Old and New Products and of New Firms with New
and Old Products
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